GROUNDS FOR OPPOSING THE AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION PLAN
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Three particular evils incident to the holocaust of personal injuries caused by the
operation of swift-moving motor-vehicles on our streets and highways are now
exciting loud demands for remedies, namely: (i) That the victims of wrongful
injuries by motorists are often without practical redress, because the wrongdoers are

financially irresponsible; (2) that the present law of liability for damages, based upon
negligence, is difficult of application to motor-vehicle accidents; and (3) that the
administration of such law by courts and juries is expensive, slow and haphazard in
its results, and is seriously congesting the courts in many jurisdictions. For each of
these evils specific remedies are being tried or proposed. Compulsory insurance of
compensation "regardless of fault"--much as under the workmen's compensation
laws-is now held out as a panacea for them all. To point out reasons for the
belief that such proposed cure-all could not even approximately fulfill the promises
held out for it and is also undesirable on account of the specific evils its adoption
would produce is the purpose of this article.
As a preliminary it needs to be noted that compulsory insurance alone, without
change in the liability law or its administration, is proposed, and has been adopted
in Massachusetts and some foreign countries, as a remedy for the evil first above
mentioned. To that theoretical remedy there are specific objections and criticisms
which apply also to the compensation plan here under criticism; but since they have
been indicated in previous articles in this series' they will not be repeated here2
though they should not be ignored.
Further it needs to be mentioned that various plans of compulsory automobile
compensation insurance have been proposed, in legislative bills and otherwise, differing widely among themselves both in major and minor features. To discuss them
all in sufficient detail to expose their respective demerits would be impracticable.
*Member of the New York State Bar since z8go, practising, in New York City, and specializing in
casualty insurance law. Commissioner of Labor of the State of New York, 1905-907. Consulting counsel
to the Association of Casualty and Surety Executives since its organization in 1929. Author of many
addresses, articles, and other writings on workmen's compensation and social insurances.
'Problems arising under the Massachusetts Act are discussed in Blanchard, Compulsory Motor Vehicle
Insurance in Massachusetts, supra p. 537, and Carpenter, Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance and Court
Congestion in Massachusetts,supra p. 554.
'For an outline of the objections to compulsory automobile "liability" insurance, based upon Massachusetts experience, see Critique of Massachusetts Automobile Liability Insurance, by Edward C. Stone, United
States Manager, Employers' Liability Insurance Corporation, Ltd. (Ass'n of Casualty and Surety Executives,
N. Y., 1935).

OPPOSING THE AUTOMOBILE COMIPNSATION PLAN

However, in 1932, a strong Committee of the Columbia University Council for Re-

search in the Social Sciences formulated a plan, complete in all essential details,3
which may be taken'to present the best thought of the advocates of compulsory compensation insurance. What follows is an analysis of and an exposition of the objections to this particular plan. It is hoped that it will be sufficient to indicate the
demerits of compulsory insurance of "compensation" for automobile accidents in
general and under all plans.4
The plan formulated by the Columbia University Committee would impose upon
the owner of every motor vehicle a liability (the payment of which he would be
required to secure by insurance) for "compensation" for every "accidental injury,"
fatal or non-fatal, to a person, including any passenger in the vehicle other than the
owner himself or the operator, "caused by the operation of" such vehicle while it
is operated by the owner or by another with his consent, express or implied. In
case two cars are involved in an accident the owner of each car would be liable
for injuries to the passengers in his own car and for injuries to the owner or operator
of the other car. In case more than two cars are involved, the owner of each car
would be liable for injuries to the owner or operator of each of the other cars, jointly
with the owner of the remaining car or cars.
A fundamental objection to this plan is that it would impose upon the owner of
every motor vehicle a liability for injuries to others "regardless of fault." Under the
specifications above outlined, a motor vehicle owner would be liable for injuries to
strangers, although due entirely to the misconduct of such strangers, utterly regardless of what the latter might be doing. If the driver of an insured car, speeding far
on the wrong side of the road, while seeking to escape pursuit by a traffic policeman, should collide with another car, properly operated, and thereby be injured,
the owner of such other car would be liable for the injury. Similarly a drunken
driver would be entitled to compensation (from the owner of the other car) for
any injury resulting from his running down another car; and drunken guests and
guests riding knowingly with a drunken driver would be entitled to compensation
(from the owner of their.car) for all injuries thereby incurred. A car load of people
could knowingly go on a ride with an unlicensed driver, connive at reckless violations of rules of the road, engage in such extra-hazardous performances as rum'See
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running, etc., and yet all be insured against risks of collision with other cars, and all
except the owner and driver be insured against all other risks.
And similarly as to pedestrians: If a sot should stagger against the side of a slowly
moving car and subsequently die from delirium tremens, "lit-up" by the shock, his
widow would be entitled to a pension from the owner of the motor vehicle involved.
If a thug or hold-up man, in an effort to make his "get-away," should dash into the
street, regardless of the traffic, and be permanently disabled by colliding with a
carefully driven car, the owner of such car would be liable to him for a pension for
long years or for life, probably payable without intermission during any term the
injured man might' serve in prison. Likewise injuries to a "jay-walker," resulting
merely from a stumble or fall in an effort to dodge a passing vehicle, without actual
collision, might (by analogy to workmen's compensation) be held to be compensable, at the expense of a stranger or strangers absolutely free from fault.
It is emphatically insisted that this goes much too far; that it would create a
regime of individual irresponsibility which would be demoralizing and the opposite
of conducive to accident prevention, that it would induce a multitude of fraudulent
abuses and impositions, and that it would subject the great body of careful and competent motorists to a grossly unjust and oppressive charge. That it would be satisfactory to the public generally (no small proportion of whom are careful and competent motorists) is simply inconceivable.
It has been contended that there are precedents for the imposition upon motorists
of a liability "regardless of fault" in some of the European laws. But such contention
is erroneous. Under some European laws the owner or operator of a motor vehicle
may be liable "without fault," but under none is he liable "regardless of fault" on
the part of the person injured, whether passenger or pedestrian.
Then it is contended that the workmen's compensation laws are closely analogous
precedents for such an imposition of a liability regardless of fault as here proposed.
In fact, however, the differences far outweigh the analogies. Under the workmen's
compensation laws the employer is liable "regardless of fault" only to his own
employees and while they are acting within the scope of their employments, subject to his orders, whereas, under this plan a motorist would be liable to strangers
whatever they might be doing. To illustrate:
Suppose an employee, to whom the care and custody of an insured car has been
confided, takes it out of the garage at night, against his employer's orders, goes on
a "joy-ride," through his own fault collides with and smashes up another car and
is injured in the collision. Under such circumstances, under the workmen's compensation law, the employer would not be liable to the employee, whereas, under
this proposed plan of compensation, the wronged stranger would.
It may be objected to these criticisms that the injustices under this plan would
not fall upon unoffending motor vehicle owners individually, as above indicated, but,
through the operation of insurance, would be spread out among motorists generally.
To an extent, that is true. Yet the burden of the cost of the insurance would fall
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unduly on the unoffending motorists. The plan, with the coverage proposed, would
not approach to that degree of average justice which characterizes workmen's compensation. Rather it would amount to a wholesale shifting of the major responsibility for the economic consequences of wrongdoing on the highways from the
wrongdoers to the unoffending. The insurance would merely disguise and mitigate
the consequences of this underlying vice.
A more strictly practical objection to this plan is that under it the conditions to
the right to compensation would be about as uncertain, difficult to apply correctly and
administer fairly and litigation breeding as are the conditions to the right to damages under the existing liability law-faults which this plan is held out to avoid.
The following analysis of the specifications of coverage under this plan, above outlined; support this proposition.
Take, first, the phrase "caused by the operation of." Presumably that phrase
would exclude injuries incurred in the maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
and in the loading and unloading of motor trucks. But how about fals in entering
or alighting from a stationary vehicle, fingers of passengers jammed in doors or
windows and other injuries of like character? Then there arises the question
whether injuries resulting from collision with a stationary vehicle (e.g., when properly parked by the curb) would be construed to be "caused by the operation of"
such vehicle. If so construed it would have the obnoxious result of making the
unoffending owner of a parked car liable for compensation for injuries to the driver
of another car who should run it down; whereas, if construed not to be so caused,
this plan would work iniquitously, for, if passengers seated in a parked car should
be injured when run into by another, insured car, driven by its owner, they would
be absolutely without redress, since there would be no one liable to them for "compensation" and his insurance would exclude all other liability on the part of +he
driver causing the injuries.
Then, it is to be noted that all "accidental injuries" would be covered, without
restriction to accidents "by collision" or "of violence." Construed as are workmen's
compensation laws, this would mean that, save as to owners and operators, such
injuries to persons riding in automobiles as result from insects, cinders or grit in
the eyes would be covered, as also would injuries due to fright or shock from merely
seeing or narrowly avoiding an accident, including the aggravation or acceleration
thereby of preExisting diseases and infirmities. That would make motorists liable
for many injuries for which now, generally, there is no liability, even where the
motorist is at fault, and would give rise to much litigation over doubtful claims.
Further, according to the specifications of coverage above outlined, the owner
would be liable for and the required insurance would have to cover compensation
for injuries to all occupants of his car, except himself and the operator. The propriety of thus excluding the owner and operator from the coverage is not questioned.
But the exclusion of the "operator" would create a fertile cause for litigation. Who
would be the excluded "operator" where the owner confides the operation of his
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car to one person and that person permits another to drive it? And in unwitnessed
accidents, where all the occupants of a car are thrown from their seats, it would
often be impossible to ascertain truly which one of the lot was the operator. On the
other hand, the expediency of requiring that the insurance "shall" cover all occupants
of the car, other than the owner and operator, is highly questionable. Under the
insurance laws of nearly all the Canadian Provinces, coverage of injuries to members
of the owner's family is prohibited, and, under the Massachusetts compulsory automobile insurance law, as well as the Canadian laws just cited, liabilities for injuries
to "guest-occupants" of the insured's car need not be covered-on account of the
prevalence of collusive claims for such injuries. By its coverage in this respect, this
plan would offer wide opportunities for successful but false attribution of injuries
to automobile accidents. Then take the case where a chauffeur, using a car with
the owner's consent, takes on guests of his own, against the owner's orders, would
the owner be obligated to insure them against injuries, regardless of their faults?
That would be going to an unconscionable extreme in the way of vicarious liability.
These objections, it is true, could readily be avoided by amendments to the plan;
but such amendments would necessitate exclusion from the protection of the pro.
posed insurance of quite a large proportion of those injured in automobile accidents;
and such excluded cases, when added to others to be noted later, would go far
toward nullifying the claim for this plan that it would assure some compensation to
approximately all victims of automobile accidents.
Again, according to such specifications, there would be no owner's liability and
consequently no insurance of compensation for injuries caused by a motor vehicle
when operated without the owner's consent. Thereby not only would the victims
of accidents caused by stolen cars be unprotected, but also, in many jurisdictions, the
victims of cars operated in violation of the owner's confidence where the owner has
confided his car to another for safekeeping only or for use only for a special purpose
or on a special occasion. Consequently there would be many cases where the compulsory insurance would not assure redress and also a large volume of litigation over
the question of fact: Was the car being operated with the owner's consent?
Finally, according to such specifications, the owner's liability, and the insurance
required of him, would apply to and cover "personal injuries" only, to the exclusion
of "property damage." 'To such restriction of coverage there are a number of
objections. It would necessitate separate proceedings, in different tribunals, on
claims for personal injuries and property damage arising out of the same accidents,
thereby multiplying litigation. And it would have the inequitable result that where
a personally irresponsible owner of a compulsorily insured "flivver," driving recklessly, should run into and wreck an expensive car and himself suffer injury from
the collision, the owner of the expensive car would be without redress for the
wrong done to him, but nevertheless be liable for the injury to the wrongdoer. Yet
there is no alternative to such discrimination, except to extend the liability and
insurance under this plan to cover "property damage" (possibly stbject to limits)
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"regardless of fault"--which would immensely increase the cost of the insurance,
and multiply the difficulties and expense of administration and adjudication.
Passing to another point: It is proposed that the "compensation" under this plan
shall be scaled, limited and payable periodically as under the workmen's compensation law of the particular state, the scale to be based upon a percentage of "earnings,"
with the substitution of arbitrary amounts for injuries to "non-earners."
The idea of thus substituting specific "compensation" payments for motor-vehicle
injuries in place of the "pot-luck" verdicts of juries in damage suit litigation, has
much to commend it to practical minds. But there is what has so far proved to be
an insuperable difficulty in devising a formula for such payments that, in actual
practice, would be fairly equitable, popularly satisfactory, capable of reasonably certain application and not too much open to abuse. The formula adopted in the
plan under criticism might be reasonable in application to such of the injured as are
employed at wages; but it would be replete with faults in application to the majority
of the injured. To illustrate:
Compensation to wage-workers is payable during "disability for work" resulting
from the injury. That formula cannot be applied to injuries to infants, invalids and
the superannuated-already incapable of work before the injury. How, then, define
or measure the additional "disability" throughout the continuance of which such
persons would be entitled to compensation? Where an employed workman is injured, there is an incentive to return to work, in order to regain full wages; such
return is almost always readily observable; and the compensation stops when it
ought to. But where an unemployed person is injured there is generally no work
to return to, the compensation is often pure gain, and there is a strong incentive to
prolong seeming disability. And what is there to prevent injured housewives and
invalids from resuming their accustomed activities in the privacy of their own homes
and yet continuing to draw compensation for alleged disability, fraudulently, for
weeks or months. "Profits" as a basis for computing compensation to the self-employed
would be more difficult to ascertain than are "wages." No reasonable formula for
measuring compensation for injuries to housewives has yet been invented. And,
finally, it is worse than doubtful whether the equality of compensation for young
persons, regardless of differences in their capacities and prospects, and for persons
with high earnings, regardless of immense differences in their losses, would meet
with public approval.
These difficulties and defects in its formula for measuring compensation do not
of themselves condemn this plan; but they would make it a doubtful experiment;
and they make it certain that, in comparison with workmen's compensation, this
plan would entail much more litigation, be open to a far greater volume of impositions and abuses, be much more expensive to administer and give rise to even
more insistent and persistent demands for liberalization of the benefits.
As a remedy for the faults attributed to the present system of court adjudication
of claims for redress for automobile accidents, it is proposed in this plan to substitute
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a system of summary administration-generally free from restraint by common law
rules of evidence or procedure-by a special board created for the purpose, with the
assistance of such referees and clerks as may be needed-as under the workmen's
compensation laws. Several advantages are claimed for this proposal:
First. An unquestionable advantage is that it would afford some relief to courts
and juries from the oppressive burden of vexatious automobile accident litigation.
But it would not do so to the extent that might be assumed upon first impression.
The following kinds of automobile accident cases would still remain to burden the
courts and juries, namely: (i) All claims for "property damage." (2) Claims for
personal injuries caused by illegally uninsured cars, "out-of-state cars" permitted to
operate without insurance in conformity with the state law, or cars operated without the owner's consent. (3) Claims for injuries to owners and operators of and
passengers in automobiles resulting from collisions between automobiles and railway
trains, street cars, horse-drawn vehicles or obstructions on or defects in the roads.
(4) Actions for damages (some in the federal courts) against residents of the state
for injuries from accidents occurring outside the state. (5) Probably some "subrogation suits" by insurance carriers, for reimbursement for compensation paid, against
"third parties" liable for negligence. And, on the other hand, such relief to judges
and juries as should actually result would be offset by the imposition of a novel and
vexatious burden on the public resulting from the multiplied, though simplified,
litigation in the new forum to be created. In 193o, under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law, there were 439,0o0 hearings before referees. Since serious injuries by automobile accidents are about as numerous as those by occupational accidents, 5 and the issues that would be involved in claims under this plan would, as
hereinbefore and hereinafter indicated, be more complex than those involved in workmen's compensation cases, it is probable that the volume of hearings entailed by this
plan, requiring attendance of parties, witnesses and doctors, would be so great as to
be a public nuisance. It is true that the volume of hearings under New York
workmen's compensation practice is needlessly excessive and could be reduced by
limiting hearings to controverted cases. But the influences that have brought about
such a burdensome administration in New York would be likely to bring about
similar results under automobile accident compensation anywhere. And even under
better administration the volume of compensation litigation in this novel forum
would be oppressive.
Second. Further, it is commonly assumed in favor of this proposed procedure
that it would operate prompdy, smoothly, and with relatively few controverted
cases and such fair adjudications as generally to satisfy reasonable minds. Such
assumption is based upon a false analogy between workmen's compensation for
occupational injuries and the proposed compensation for automobile injuries, and
'In Massachusetts, for the twelve months ending June 30, 1933, 31,769 "tabulatable injuries" (162
fatal) by industrial accidents were reported, whereas, for the calendar year 1934, there were 921 "fatalities"
and 53,055 "injuries" by automobile accidents reported and about 6o,ooo claims made for injuries by such
accidents.
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upon a lack of appreciation of the actual results of this practice in the field of
workmen's compensation. On the one hand, under automobile compensation,
doubtful questions of fact would be relatively far more frequent than under workmen's compensation, and the practical difficulties of ascertaining the facts would be
far greater. In a larger proportion of cases there would be no impartial witnesses
of the alleged accidents available. There would be more collusion between the insured and claimants-who, in large proportion, would be guests and members of
the insured's own families. There would be no employers concerned to certify to
earnings and to control the facts as to absence from work. And the claimants would
include a far larger proportion of invalids and the aged, with alleged aggravations
of preExisting ailments, difficult to prove, disprove, measure or control. On the other
hand, while, under workmen's compensation, this plan of administration does result
in prompt awards of redress to the injured, that result is effected largely by presuming claims to be valid, without regard to the weight of evidence, giving claimants
the benefit of every doubt. The effect, in practice, has been to extend workmen's
compensation for occupational injuries'beyond its logical purview and intent, far
into the fields of health, old-age, survivors' and unemployment insurance. That
may be tolerable as between employers and their employees. But it almost certainly
would be intolerable as between motor-vehicle owners and all the unfortunates who
might make claims against their automobile compensation insurance. In the minds
of those who have closely observed experience in the field of workmen's compensation, there is a strong reaction in favor of a return toward more strictly judicial
practices; and the present proposal to extend disregard of evidence, in favor of
indiscriminate relief to those who claim to suffer injuries on the highways, at the
expense of a class vicariously held to be collectively responsible, is a cause for alarm.
Reasonably it is to be feared that the election to resort to such radical and unprecedented means for relief from the existing faults of court procedure, in lieu of
seeking means to simplify and improve such procedure, would be a very unfortunate
leap out of the frying pan into the fire. 6
A vital feature of this plan is that this liability for "compensation," if duly insured, would be "exclusive," that is, it would be in lieu of all other liability for
compensation or damages for personal injury or death caused by the operation of
the insured motor vehicle. This is as it practically must be, since, unless the liability
be "exclusive," that is, if the injured should be given the option either to accept
compensation or to sue for full damages under the present liability law, the result
would be, to increase the existing volume of litigation and to raise the cost of the
insurances needed by motorists for protection against the alternative liabilities to
manifestly prohibitive levels. Moreover it would be shamefully inequitable to hold
motorists liable in full damages for injuries found to be due to their faults and yet
mulct them heavily to compensate for injuries attributable to the faults of the
*As to the alternative of simplifying and improving court procedure, see MAss. JuD. COUNCIL, FoUaRT
REPoRT, r928. For a discussion of recent measures to combat court congestion in Massachusetts, see Carpenter, Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance and Court Congestion in Massachusetts, supra, p. 554.
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injured. But such exclusive compensation, with limits as proposed in this plan
(although such limits are so high as to threaten an intolerable cost), would result
in a denial of adequate redress for many grievous and flagrant wrongs. Where a
successful business executive, artist or professional man is killed or permanently
incapacitated, the compensation might amount to less than xo or 20 per cent of the
economic loss. It is questionable whether, in this respect, the plan would meet with
public approval. Certainly it would result in perpetual political agitations for
progressive "liberalization" of the benefits.
In the Report of the Columbia University Committee, in which this plan was
presented, it is contended in its favor that the plan "would make it reasonably
certain that all persons with appreciable injuries would receive some compensation."
That contention has a strong popular appeal. But it is highly exaggerated. This
plan would guarantee no compensation or redress to the victims of uninsured "outof-state cars" (that is, cars registered in other states and permitted to operate without
compliance with the local insurance law), of "bootleg-cars" (that is, cars uninsured
in violation of law), of cars being used without the owners' consent, of unidentified
"hit-and-run cars," of cars insured by insolvent insurance carriers, and (in many
jurisdictions) of cars owned by the state and its subdivisions while operated for
governmental purposes, or to owners and operators injured in single car accidents.
Moreover, if some objections to the insurance coverage proposed under this plan,
hereinbefore noted, are to be avoided by amendments, other large classes must be
excluded.
Such gaps in the promised protection are no small matter. Even in well-policed
Massachusetts, "bootleg cars" are estimated to be numbered by thousands. And
touring cars are numbered by hundreds of thousands, not to mention cars that
occasionally cross state lines in local traffic. Of the total number of cars involved
in the reported accidents in Connecticut in 1932, over 13 per cent were owned "outof-state"; and in Rhode Island in 1930 over 20 per cent of reported automobile
fatalities were caused by "out-of-state cars."
In this connection it is to be noted that the plan is ambiguous as to the liability
law to which "out-of-state cars," uninsured in compliance with this plan, would be
subject in a state in which the plan should be adopted. If their owners should be
treated as in default, and held personally liable for compensation regardless of
fault, or for full damages for fault, at the option of the injured person, the lot of
the out-of-state motorist would be perilous indeed; whereas if they should be subject
to liability for fault only, there would be a big gap in the promised protection of
"compensation regardless of fault" for the public of the state. And in either case
there would be no protection against financially irresponsible owners of "out-of-state
cars," uninsured in any form, and no guarantee of redress to passengers in "out-ofstate cars" when injured through the negligent operation of cars duly insured in
accordance with this plan. Such unsatisfactory condition would continue until the
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plan should be adopted throughout the states generally-a contingency which, it is
submitted, is at the least remote.
The authors of this plan claim that the insurance it would require of motor
vehicle owners could be provided either (i) by private companies; (z) by private
companies and a competitive state-fund; or (3) by a monopolistic state-fund; presumptively as under the workmen's compensation law of the particular state. This
proposition ignores the fact that the automobile is a vehicle with -a wide range of
movement and calls for a nation-wide, uniform system of insurance, effective to
cover liabilities under the varying laws of the several states, to the end that the
motorists everywhere may readily obtain, and thereby be induced to obtain, insurance that would everywhere protect both themselves and the public. But statefunds are ill adapted to function outside of their home states; and a requirement of
insurance in different carriers in different states would create a condition of confusion and inadvertent defaults manifestly disadvantageous for motorists and the
public alike. Practically, therefore, this plan does not permit of the options mentioned but would necessitate either a regime of insurance in competing private
companies, functioning throughout the country generally, or a national public insurance fund. To those who are opposed to "state insurance," this is no objection
to the plan. But it would preclude resort by the several states to state-fund insurance
monopolies as a method of reducing the insurance cost-a method which in the
writer's opinion, is delusory but which commands much popular credence.
This leads to the question of cost.
This plan of compensation has a strong popular appeal, since it promises lots of
"easy money" to pretty nearly all sufferers from motor vehicle accidents. But a
drawback is that the motor vehicle owners, whose money it is proposed to distribute
thus lavishly, may rebel at the cost. The cost therefore looms up as a critical
question.
Estimates of the cost by competent actuaries have been unobtainable, such experts not daring to estimate it because of the large number of uncertain factors and
the lack of any sufficiently analogous experience upon which to base calculations.
Experience under compilsory liability insurance in Massachusetts is not analogous,
particularly because of the differences in coverage and because under the Massachusetts plan the compulsory insurance is limited in amount to $5,000 for injury to any
one person and to $io,ooo for all injuries resulting from any one accident, whereas
the insurance required under this plan would be unlimited or practically so. And
experience under workmen's compensation is only remotely analogous, owing to
differences, under this plan, in the character of the accidents covered and of the
persons affected and in other features hereinbefore noted. Moreover under workmen's compensation the cost of the medical benefits has not yet become stable but
generally is still progressively increasing. In Massachusetts, between 1915 and i93o,
the cost of the medical benefits under workmen's compensation increased some 450
per cent. In New York, from 1919 to 1928, such cost increased from $3,414,22 6 to

6o8

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

$9,73I,o81; and now a further increase (relatively to the number of compensable injuries) seems to be impending. The fact that such a progressive increase in the
cost of the medical benefits might prevail under this proposed plan makes it hopelessly impossible to estimate even remotely what such cost might eventually amount
to. And it would be a major item in the total cost.
Notwithstanding such deterrents, the Report of the Columbia University Committee presents an estimate, based upon some actuarial advice, to the effect that
the compulsory insurance, under this plan, of compensation with the New York
scale of benefits, would cost only about 1.61 times the cost of compulsory automobile
liability insurance under the Massachusetts plan. Prima facie that seems encouraging. But Massachusetts experience indicates that the mere adoption of compulsory
insurance, where voluntary insurance now prevails, would result in an increase in
the pure loss-cost of liability insurance, fairly moderate in rural districts but possibly
running up closely to ioo per cent in congested urban and suburban districts.
Manifestly a charge on motorists of 1.6i times twice the rates for automobile insurance that now prevail in New York City, for example, would be staggering. Moreover the writer has checked up the Committee's estimate, also with some actuarial
advice, and seriously questions the figure 1.61 in such estimate, on the ground that
it is based upon inadequate allowances for the cost of the medical benefits and of
impositions upon the cash benefits, in excess of those incident to workmen's compensation, to which the plan of compensation would be open.
Lack of space forbidq a more detailed discussion of this question of cost. But, in
conclusion, it may be asserted with confidence that there are good grounds for the
belief that it is beyond human capacity to prognosticate even approximately what
the cost of insurance under this plan, if ever adopted, would amount to in a few
years, when "claim consciousness" is aroused. And, however that may be, certainly
there is no basis for a reasonable assurance that such cost would not so far exceed
the estimate above criticised as to be far beyond the means of a large proportion of
those who now benefit from the use of motor vehicles.
In addition to the objections to this plan of relief for victims of automobile accidents above briefly set forth or referred to, there are some objections to its constitutionality. These may be passed over since they could be removed by constitutional amendments, if this plan should win general popular approval, whereas if
other objections to this plan be sufficient to condemn it in public estimation,
specifications of constitutional objections are superfluous.
Enough has been said, it is submitted, to lead to the latter conclusion. It is not
denied that some features in this plan may contain germs of ideas from which may
be developed practices that would improve present conditions in some respects. But
by and large this plan is too widely revolutionary; it goes much too far in many
directions; in practice it would fall far short of fulfilling the promises held out for
it; and, in lieu of such existing evils as it might alleviate, it would substitute others
of greater magnitude.

